

Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? A state-of-the-art report

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Summary This paper surveys the debate regarding Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states and reviews the modified or alternative typologies ensuing from this debate. We confine ourselves to the classifications which have been developed by Esping-Andersen's critics in order to cope with the following alleged shortcomings of his typology: (1) the misspecification of the Mediterranean welfare states as immature Continental ones; (2) the labelling of the Antipodean welfare states as belonging to the 'liberal' regime type; (3) a neglect of the gender-dimension in social policy. We reconstruct several typologies of welfare states in order to establish, first, whether real welfare states are quite similar to others or whether they are rather unique specimens, and, second, whether there are three ideal-typical worlds of welfare capitalism or more. We conclude that real welfare states are hardly ever pure types and are usually hybrid cases; and that the issue of ideal-typical welfare states cannot be satisfactorily answered given the lack of formal theorizing and the still inconclusive outcomes of comparative research. In spite of this conclusion there is plenty of reason to continue to work on and with the original or modified typologies.

Key words comparative social policy analysis, typology, welfare state regimes, worlds of welfare capitalism

Résumé Nous présentons un état des lieux des débats qui ont entouré la typologie des Etats providences proposée par Esping-Andersen ainsi que des typologies modifiées ou alternatives qui ont été présentées par la suite. Nous nous limiterons aux classifications qui ont été proposées par les critiques du travail d'Esping Andersen qui visaient à dépasser les «prétendues» limitations de sa typologie. 1) une mauvaise spécification des Etats providence méditerranéens comme des Etats providences continentaux inachevés 2) la labélisation des Etats providences des Antipodes comme appartenant au régime de type «libéral» 3) la non prise en compte de l'effet «genre» dans les politiques sociales. Nous avons reconstruit différentes typologies d'Etats Providences afin d'établir, tout d'abord si la réalité des Etats Providences est unique ou si certains sont fort semblables et ensuite s'il existe trois idéal type d'Etats providences ou davantage?

Nous sommes arrivé à la conclusion que: premièrement les Etats providences réels sont rarement des cas purs mais constituent bien plus des hybridations. En deuxième lieu, on ne peut répondre de manière satisfaisante à la question de savoir le nombre d'idéal types d'Etats Providences du fait de l'absence de théorisation adéquate et parce que les résultats des recherches comparatives ne permettent pas de conclure dans un sens ou un autre. Troisièmement, en dépit de cette conclusion, il existe de multiples raisons pour continuer à travailler sur et à partir des typologies originales ou modifiées.

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Introduction

When Esping-Andersen (1990) published his *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* it was received with applause (Offe, 1991; Cnaan, 1992; Hicks, 1991; Kohl, 1993). After a few years, the book even became a modern classic. Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen (1993; 1994; 1996; 1997; 1999) has been forced time after time by both his critics and his adherents to elaborate on his original arguments. The tenet of Esping-Andersen's treatise of the welfare state was that, for a long time in both the theoretical and empirical literature, too little attention had been given to cross-national differences in welfare state structures.¹ In spite of this putative lack of attention he could – theoretically and empirically – stand ‘on the shoulders of giants’. Theoretically, the work of Marshall (1950; 1963; 1965; 1981) and Titmuss (1958; 1974) laid the foundations for Esping-Andersen's typology (Boje, 1996: 19). Empirically, he could profit from the comparative research by, among others, Wilensky (1975), Flora and Heidenheimer (1981), Mommsen (1981) and Flora (1983; 1986). He argued that we are entering better times because ‘the most intensive activity of welfare state theorising at the moment has become identifying diversity, specifying welfare state typologies’ (Esping-Andersen, 1994: 715). Research has to follow theory's lead because ‘only comparative empirical research will adequately disclose the fundamental properties that unite or divide modern welfare states’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 3). In his ‘seminal’ book he suited the action to the word by constructing today's best-known and most frequently used typology of welfare states, and by empirically testing whether distinct welfare states that resemble his ideal-types can be observed.

For accomplishing this feat, he not only received wide critical acclaim and constructive criticism, but also some negative criticism. The more amicable critics argue that his typology has merits but is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and therefore needs revising. Others refer

to theoretical and methodological shortcomings (cf. Lessenich and Ostner, 1998). The more hostile critics feel that typologies as such have no explanatory power and, therefore, his scheme does not contribute to proper theorizing about what is happening with and within welfare states (cf. Baldwin, 1996).

In this paper, we give an overview of the debate about Esping-Andersen's typology during the last decade and review the state of the art of typifying welfare states at the turn of the millennium. The pivotal questions are as follows: How and why has the welfare state developed? How and why do national welfare systems differ from one another – or are they similar to each other? Do welfare states cluster into different regime types and, if so, how and why? It is not our intention to raise new questions. Our objective is to settle affairs, for the time being, by giving an overview of what we think is the gist of the discussion, by weighting the most important arguments and taking stock of the modelling business. To achieve this goal, we elaborate on earlier overviews by Abrahamson (1999), Arts and Gelissen (1999) and Kohl (2000). First, we review the debate with respect to Esping-Andersen's typology and modified versions of it. Second, we try to establish whether there are three ideal-typical worlds of welfare capitalism or more. Third, we outline which authors identify which national states as belonging to a particular type of welfare state. This means that we will not only look at ideal worlds of welfare capitalism, but also at real ones.

Ideal-types

Do typologies based on ideal-types have theoretical and empirical value as Esping-Andersen assumes? The conclusion emerging from the philosophy of science literature is clear: not if ideal-types are goals in themselves, but only if they are the means to a goal; namely, the representation of a reality, which cannot (yet) be described using laws (Klant, 1984). This

means that typologies are only fruitful to an empirical science that is still in its infancy. In contrast, a mature empirical science emphasizes the construction of theories and not the formulation of typologies. There are good reasons to argue that the comparative macro-sociology of welfare states is still in *statu nascendi*. Therefore the formulation of typologies could be useful. Before answering the question of whether welfare state typologies based on ideal-types are not only useful but also have explanatory value, we first consider what Esping-Andersen himself says about the methodological status of his typology.

He addresses the question of whether the welfare state is merely the sum total of a nation's social policy repertoire, or whether it is an institutional force above and beyond a given policy array. His answer is straightforward: the welfare state cannot be regarded as the sum total of social policies, it is more than a numerical cumulation of discrete programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1994: 712). Therefore, in the relation between state and economy, he defines welfare state regimes as a complex of legal and organizational features that are systematically interwoven. Esping-Andersen (1990: 3, 26, 32) boldly suggests that when we focus on the principles embedded in welfare states, variations are not linearly distributed around a common denominator. They are clustered around three highly diverse regime-types, each organized according to its own discrete logic of organization, stratification, and societal integration. Therefore, we can identify three models, or ideal-types of welfare states: conservative, liberal and social-democratic. These ideal-types owe their origins to different historical forces and they follow qualitatively different developmental trajectories. Contrary to the ideal world of welfare states, the real world is likely to exhibit hybrid forms. There are no one-dimensional nations in the sense of a pure case. Today, every country presents a system mix. Esping-Andersen (1997: 171) argues that despite this it is fruitful to construct ideal-types for the sake of economy: to be able to

see the forest rather than the myriad of unique trees. However, he warns of the danger that the resulting forest may bear little resemblance to reality.

Looking for a more detailed answer to the question of the theoretical status of ideal-types and typologies, we must return to the locus classicus: Weber's methodological essays. Weber (1949; 1968 [1922]) deals with two different kinds of ideal-types, individualistic and holistic ones (cf. Hempel, 1965 [1952]; Rogers, 1969; Watkins, 1969 [1953]). Esping-Andersen's ideal-types of welfare state regimes are holistic. They propose to give a bird's eye view of the broad characteristics of a social or historical situation. The ideality of such types lies in their simplification and aloofness from detail. They emphasize the 'essential' features of a situation considered as a whole. By comparing an impure welfare state with an ideal-typical one – both considered as a whole – the deviations of the former from the latter are thrown into relief. It is the simultaneous knowledge of both the ideal-type and the real-type that enables holistic ideal-types to be used 'as conceptual instruments for comparison with and measurement of reality' (Watkins, 1969 [1953]: 458–9).

From a logical point of view (von Kempski, 1972), the general term 'welfare state' is a label for a certain class of democratic industrial capitalist societies, characterized by certain properties (i.e. social citizenship or the fact that more or less extensive welfare provisions are legally provided, or, in still other words, the fact that the state plays a principal part in the welfare mix alongside the market, civil society, and the family). Welfare states have seldom been established as a result of big plans or big fights, but mostly as results of complex processes and successive steps of social and political engineering in the history of democratic industrial capitalist societies. In spite of the largely incremental emergence of welfare states, Esping-Andersen is of the opinion that this class of societies does not consist of a great number of unique cases, but that they cluster together in three distinct

subclasses. Each of the three types he identifies with a deep tradition in political mobilization and political philosophy (conservatism, liberalism and socialism respectively) which then link to particular features of contemporary social policy (and broader political economy) configurations.

To determine the characteristics of these subclasses without going back in history, two indicators are crucial: decommodification and stratification. Together they define a two-dimensional property-space. Although real welfare states are most of the time not unique, they certainly are never completely similar. This means that they are almost always impure types. The consequence is that although they cluster together in three subclasses it is not always easy to classify all cases unambiguously. In practice it is possible that different judges assign a particular welfare state to different subclasses. Interjudge validity can be accomplished by assessing which ideal-type – the extreme limiting cases in this ordering – they approximate best. By comparing impure real welfare states to ideal-types, the deviations of the ‘impure’ real-types are contrasted with the ‘purity’ of the ideal-type. This simultaneous recognizability of both the ideal and the real-type make it possible to use holistic ideal-types as conceptual instruments for comparison and for the empirical determination of reality (Watkins, 1969 [1953]). But accurate ordering is not enough. After all, ideal-types are also instruments for providing explanations. If we use them to satisfy this objective, they should not only be understood as a conceptual system but also as a system of theoretical statements. These should encompass testable, general hypotheses or, at least, provide a framework for interpretation (Hempel, 1965 [1952]).

To what conclusion does the preceding reflection lead? In reply to Esping-Andersen’s fiercest critics, we can say that their criticism is unjust if certain conditions are met. The first condition is that the typology is a valid and reliable instrument for classifying welfare states. Whether this condition holds will be

tested later on in this paper. The second condition is that the typology is a means to an end – explanation – and not an end in itself. Esping-Andersen uses the regime types not only as dependent variables but also as independent variables to explain cross-national variations in dependent variables such as social behaviour and social attitudes. He also uses the typology to postulate and explain the occurrence of positive feedback loops. According to him, existing institutional welfare arrangements heavily determine, maybe even over-determine, national trajectories (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 4). This suggests path-dependency. This is because the stratification outcomes of particular arrangements shape class coalitions, which tend to reproduce the original institutional matrix and welfare outcomes. This means that policies provide incentives that encourage individuals and groups to act in ways that lock in a particular path of policy development (cf. Pierson, 1993).

A third condition for accepting typologizing as a legitimate endeavour is that theory construction on welfare states is still in an early stage. This is also true. Boje (1996: 18) argues that the present ‘state of the art’ in most welfare state research is characterized by a lack of theory. Few theoretical alternatives are available. At the most, one can think of marxist explanations (see, for example Therborn, 1995) or de Swaan’s (1988) synthesis of rational-choice theories and figurational sociology. The construction of ideal-types can be fruitful under the condition that these will eventually lead to theories. We will return to this issue in the final section.

Three worlds of ‘welfare capitalism’ . . .

The central explanatory questions Esping-Andersen (1990: 4, 105) asks are: Why is the world composed of three qualitatively different welfare-state logics? Why do nations crystallize into distinct regime-clusters? These questions demand a theoretical answer. Since

he is of the opinion that the existing theoretical models of the welfare state are inadequate, reconceptualization and retheorization are necessary. In answering these questions he starts with the orienting statement that history and politics matter. Or, more specifically: 'The historical characteristics of states, especially the history of political class coalitions as the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations, have played a determinate role in forging the emergence of their welfare-statism' (1990: 1).

What are the historical and political forces behind the regime differences? According to Esping-Andersen (1990: 29), three interacting factors are significant: the nature of class mobilization (especially of the working class), class-political action structures, and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization. The provisional answer to his central questions is therefore: If you look at the history of so-called welfare states you find three ideal-typical trajectories, a liberal, a conservative and a social-democratic one. Fortunately, one does not have to go back in history, however, in order to typify 'real' welfare states. We can characterize them, as we have mentioned before, by looking at their positions on two fundamental dimensions of welfare statism:

1. The degree of decommodification, i.e. the degree to which a (social) service is rendered as a matter of right, and the degree to which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.
2. The kind of social stratification and solidarities, i.e. which social stratification system is promoted by social policy and does the welfare state build narrow or broad solidarities?

What are the characteristics of the three distinct regime-types to which the historical forces lead? To answer this question, Esping-Andersen (1990: 73) argues that although the before-mentioned dimensions are conceptually independent, according to his 'theory' he would expect that there is sufficient covariation for distinct regime clusters to emerge. In

accordance with this theoretical expectation, he succeeds in empirically identifying three closely paralleled models – ideal-types – of regime-types on both the stratification and the decommodification dimension. There appears to be a clear coincidence of high decommodification and strong universalism in the Scandinavian, social-democratically influenced welfare states. There is an equally clear coincidence of low decommodification and strong individualistic self-reliance in the liberal Anglo-Saxon nations. Finally, the Continental European countries group closely together as corporatist and etatist, and are also modestly decommodifying (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 77).

In spite of anomalies such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, the overall picture is convincing, at least at first glance. This empirical success permits a more extensive description of these three worlds of welfare capitalism. First, there is the liberal type of welfare capitalism, which embodies individualism and the primacy of the market. The operation of the market is encouraged by the state, either actively – subsidizing private welfare schemes – or passively by keeping (often means tested) social benefits to a modest level for the demonstrably needy. There is little redistribution of incomes within this type of welfare state and the realm of social rights is rather limited. This welfare regime is characterized by a low level of decommodification. The operation of the liberal principle of stratification leads to division in the population: on the one hand, a minority of low-income state dependants and, on the other hand, a majority of people able to afford private social insurance plans. In this type of welfare state, women are encouraged to participate in the labour force, particularly in the service sector.

Second, there is a world of conservative-corporatist welfare states, which is typified by a moderate level of decommodification. This regime type is shaped by the twin historical legacy of Catholic social policy,² on the one side, and corporatism and etatism on the other side. This blend had three important

consequences in terms of stratification. In the first place, the direct influence of the state is restricted to the provision of income maintenance benefits related to occupational status. This means that the sphere of solidarity remains quite narrow and corporatist. Moreover, labour market participation by married women is strongly discouraged, because corporatist regimes – influenced by the Church – are committed to the preservation of traditional family structures. Another important characteristic of the conservative regime type is the principle of subsidiarity: the state will only interfere when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 27).

Finally, Esping-Andersen recognizes a social-democratic world of welfare capitalism. Here, the level of decommodification is high, and the social-democratic principle of stratification is directed towards achieving a system of generous universal and highly distributive benefits not dependent on any individual contributions. In contrast to the liberal type of welfare states, 'this model crowds out the market and, consequently, constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). Social policy within this type of welfare state is aimed at a maximization of capacities for individual independence. Women in particular – regardless of whether they have children or not – are encouraged to participate in the labour market, especially in the public sector. Countries that belong to this type of welfare state regime are generally dedicated to full employment. Only by making sure that as many people as possible have a job is it possible to maintain such a high-level solidaristic welfare system.

... Or more?

In the Introduction, we indicated the tremendous impact of Esping-Andersen's work on comparative social policy analysis. Since then, several authors have developed alternative

typologies or added one or more types to existing classifications for greater empirical refinement. From this vast array of welfare state typologies we have selected six classifications, which we think draw attention to interesting characteristics of welfare states not directly included in Esping-Andersen's classification. All these typologies and their main characteristics are summarized in Table 1.

These alternative classifications relate to three important criticisms of Esping-Andersen's classification (for these and other points of critique see Schmidt, 1998; Gough, 2000b).³ First, the misspecification of the Mediterranean welfare states; second, labelling the Antipodean welfare states as belonging to the 'liberal' welfare state regime; and finally, the neglect of the gender-dimension in social policy. In the following sections, we will discuss these criticisms in more detail and present some of the alternative classifications developed by his critics.

The Mediterranean

One important criticism of Esping-Andersen's classification is that he did not systematically include the Mediterranean countries. Specifically, in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* Italy belongs – according to him – to the family of the corporatist welfare state regimes, whereas Spain, Portugal and Greece are not covered by his typology. Although he admits that these countries have some important characteristics in common – i.e. a Catholic imprint (with the exception of Greece) and a strong familialism (Esping-Andersen, 1997: 180) – he seems to include them in the continental/corporatist model. His omission of a systematic treatment of the Mediterranean has brought about a lively debate about the existence of a 'Southern' or 'Latin Rim' model of social policy. For example, Katrougalos (1996) supports Esping-Andersen's position by arguing that the Mediterranean countries 'do not form a distinct group but rather a subcategory, a

Table 1 An overview of typologies of welfare states

	<i>Types of welfare states and their characteristics</i>	<i>Indicators/dimensions</i>
Esping-Andersen (1990)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: Low level of decommodification; market-differentiation of welfare 2. <i>Conservative</i>: Moderate level of decommodification; social benefits mainly dependent on former contributions and status 3. <i>Social-democratic</i>: High level of decommodification; universal benefits and high degree of benefit equality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decommodification • Stratification
Leibfried (1992)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Anglo-Saxon (Residual)</i>: Right to income transfers; welfare state as compensator of last resort and tight enforcer of work in the market place 2. <i>Bismarck (Institutional)</i>: Right to social security; welfare state as compensator of first resort and employer of last resort 3. <i>Scandinavian (Modern)</i>: Right to work for everyone; universalism; welfare state as employer of first resort and compensator of last resort 4. <i>Latin Rim (Rudimentary)</i>: Right to work and welfare proclaimed; welfare state as a semi-institutionalized promise 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty, social insurance and poverty policy
Castles & Mitchell (1993)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: Low social spending and no adoption of equalizing instruments in social policy 2. <i>Conservative</i>: High social expenditures, but little adoption of equalizing instruments in social policy 3. <i>Non-Right Hegemony</i>: High social expenditure and use of highly equalizing instruments in social policy 4. <i>Radical</i>: Achievement of equality in pre-tax, pre-transfer income (adoption of equalizing instruments in social policy), but little social spending 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welfare expenditure • Benefit equality • Taxes
Siaroff (1994)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Protestant Liberal</i>: Minimal family welfare, yet relatively egalitarian gender situation in the labour market; family benefits are paid to the mother, but are rather inadequate 2. <i>Advanced Christian-democratic</i>: No strong incentives for women to work, but strong incentives to stay at home 3. <i>Protestant Social-democratic</i>: True work-welfare choice for women; family benefits are high and always paid to the mother; importance of Protestantism 4. <i>Late Female Mobilization</i>: Absence of Protestantism; family benefits are usually paid to the father; universal female suffrage is relatively new 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family welfare orientation • Female work desirability • Extent of family benefits being paid to women
Ferrera (1996)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Anglo-Saxon</i>: Fairly high welfare state cover; social assistance with a means test; mixed system of financing; highly integrated organizational framework entirely managed by a public administration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rules of access (eligibility)

continued over

Table 1 *continued*

	<i>Types of welfare states and their characteristics</i>	<i>Indicators/dimensions</i>
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. <i>Bismarck</i>: strong link between work position (and/or family state) and social entitlements; benefits proportional to income; financing through contributions; reasonably substantial social assistance benefits; insurance schemes mainly governed by unions and employer organizations 3. <i>Scandinavian</i>: social protection as a citizenship right; universal coverage; relatively generous fixed benefits for various social risks; financing mainly through fiscal revenues; strong organizational integration 4. <i>Southern</i>: fragmented system of income guarantees linked to work position; generous benefits without articulated net of minimum social protection; health care as a right of citizenship; particularism in payments of cash benefits and financing; financing through contributions and fiscal revenues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Benefit formulae • Financing regulations • Organizational–managerial arrangements
Bonoli (1997)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>British</i>: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions (Beveridge); low social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 2. <i>Continental</i>: High percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions (Bismarck); high social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 3. <i>Nordic</i>: Low percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions (Beveridge); high social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 4. <i>Southern</i>: High percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions (Bismarck); low social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bismarck and Beveridge model • Quantity of welfare state expenditure
Korpi & Palme (1998)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Basic Security</i>: Entitlements based on citizenship <i>or</i> contributions; application of the flat-rate benefit principle 2. <i>Corporatist</i>: Entitlements based on occupational category <i>and</i> labour force participation; use of the earnings-related benefit principle 3. <i>Encompassing</i>: Entitlement based on citizenship <i>and</i> labour force participation; use of the flat-rate and earnings-related benefit principle 4. <i>Targeted</i>: Eligibility based on proved need; use of the minimum benefit principle 5. <i>Voluntary State Subsidized</i>: Eligibility based on membership or contributions; application of the flat-rate or earnings-related principle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bases of entitlement • Benefit principle • Governance of social insurance programme

variant of the Continental model. They are merely underdeveloped species of the Continental model, welfare states in their infancy, with the main common characteristics being the immaturity of the social protection systems and some similar social and family structures' (Katrougalos, 1996: 43). However, according to other commentators (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Trifiletti, 1999) it seems logical to see the South European countries as a separate cluster. They have developed classifications of European welfare states which try to show the existence of a separate 'southern model' of social policy.

Leibfried (1992) distinguishes four social policy or poverty regimes within the countries of the European Community: the Scandinavian welfare states, the 'Bismarck' countries, the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Latin Rim countries. These policy regimes are based on different policy models – modern, institutional, residual and rudimentary – in which social citizenship has developed in different and sometimes incomplete ways. Within these policy regimes, welfare state institutions have a different function in combating poverty. However, it is particularly important that Leibfried adds a fourth category – the 'Latin Rim' countries – to Esping-Andersen's original classification. He emphasizes as an important characteristic of these countries the lack of an articulated social minimum and a right to welfare.

Ferrera (1996) also argues explicitly for the inclusion of a 'Southern model' of social policy (1996: 4–7). He concentrates on four dimensions of social security systems: the rules of access (eligibility rules), the conditions under which benefits are granted, the regulations to finance social protection and, finally, the organizational-managerial arrangements to administrate the various social security schemes. Based on these dimensions, he makes a distinction between the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Bismarckian and Southern countries. The Scandinavian countries are characterized by universal coverage for the

risks of life. The right to social protection is attributed on the basis of citizenship. The Anglo-Saxon family of welfare states is also characterized by a highly inclusive social security coverage, but only in the area of health care can one speak of fully universal risk coverage. Also flat-rate benefits and means testing play an important role. In the third group of countries, the relationship between social security entitlements, a person's labour market status and role within the family (breadwinner or not) is still clearly visible. Contributions play an important role in financing the various schemes. Almost everybody has social insurance coverage through their own or derived rights. Finally, the social protection systems of Southern countries are highly fragmented and, although there is no articulated net of minimum social protection, some benefits levels are very generous (such as old age pensions). Moreover, in these countries health care is institutionalized as a right of citizenship. However, in general, there is relatively little state intervention in the welfare sphere. Another important feature is the high level of particularism with regard to cash benefits and financing, expressed in high levels of clientelism. The most important features of each type are summarized in Table 1.

Bonoli (1997) uses the Mediterranean countries – among others – to develop the final classification we wish to discuss in this section. He is especially critical of the declassification approach. According to him, it does not allow one to discriminate effectively between the Bismarckian and the Beveridgean approaches to social policy. As an alternative, he combines two approaches to the classification of welfare states. One concentrates on the 'how much' dimension (emphasized in the Anglo-Saxon literature) and the other on the 'how' dimension of social policy (emphasized in the Continental-European or French tradition). As an empirical indicator of the first dimension, he uses social expenditure as a proportion of GDP, and of the second dimension the percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions. These indicators lead

him to identify four types of countries: the British countries, the Continental European countries, the Nordic countries and the Southern countries, thus giving credit to the proposal of a 'Southern model'.

Upon examining the combined arguments of Leibfried, Ferrera and Bonoli, as presented in Table 1, it appears that a strong similarity exists among their first three types and those of Esping-Andersen. However, all three authors add a fourth – Mediterranean – type of welfare state regime to the original Esping-Andersenian classification. Using empirical evidence, they argue that this is a prototype rather than a subcategory of the continental/corporatist model.

The Antipodes

Esping-Andersen also discusses the Antipodean countries (i.e. Australia and New Zealand) as representatives of the liberal welfare state regime. This is because of their marginal commitment to public welfare and strong reliance on means testing. However, according to Castles (1998), Australia and New Zealand have a more particular and a more inclusive approach to social protection than the standard liberal form. Thresholds are set at comparatively high levels, so that a large part of the population receives some means-tested benefits. The result is that the Antipodes exhibit the world's most comprehensive systems of means-tested income support benefits. Redistribution has been traditionally pursued through wage controls and employment security rather than social programmes. Income guarantees, realized by using market regulation thus play an important role in the institutional set-up of these welfare states. It therefore seems that the Antipodean countries represent a separate social policy model. It led Castles and Mitchell (1993) to question whether 'social spending is the only route to greater income redistribution', implying that there may be other ways than income maintenance by which states may mitigate the effects of market forces.

In a discussion of their study, Hill (1996) points out that Castles and Mitchell's critique of Esping-Andersen's work essentially follows two lines. In the first place, they draw attention to the fact that political activity from the Left may have been introduced into those countries in the achievement of equality in pre-tax, pre-transfer income rather than in the pursuit of equalization through social policy. Second, they argue – again about Australia but also with relevance to the United Kingdom – that the Esping-Andersen approach disregards the potential for income-related benefits to make an effective contribution to redistribution. Australian income maintenance is almost entirely means-tested. It uses an approach that neither concentrates on a liberal-type redistribution to the very poor, nor resembles the more universal social-democratic and hierarchical solidaristic conservative ideal-types highlighted in Esping-Andersen's study (Hill, 1996: 46). This is the reason why Castles and Mitchell develop an alternative, four-way classification of welfare states: Liberal, Conservative, Non-Right Hegemony and Radical. This utilizes the level of welfare expenditure (i.e. household transfers as a percentage of GDP); average benefit equality; and income and profit taxes as a percentage of GDP.

Other evidence for the exceptional position of the Antipodean countries, specifically Australia, is found when countries are classified according to the typology developed by Korpi and Palme (1998). This is based on institutional characteristics of welfare states. They try to investigate the causal factors which influence the institutional aspects of the welfare state on the one hand, and the effects of institutions on the formation of interests, preferences and identities – as well as on the degree of poverty and inequality in a society – on the other hand. They argue that institutional structures can be expected to reflect the role of conflicts among interest groups, while they are also likely to form important frameworks for the definitions of interests and identities among citizens. They can thereby be

expected to influence coalition formation, which is significant for income redistribution and poverty. As the basis of their classification, Korpi and Palme take the institutional structures of two social programmes – old age pensions and sickness cash benefits – which they consider to lie at the heart of the welfare state. The institutional structures of the two programmes are classified according to three aspects: the bases of entitlements, the principles applied to determine benefit levels (to what extent social insurance should replace lost income), and the governance of a social insurance programme (whether or not representatives of employers and employees participate in the governing of a programme). Based on these three aspects, they discriminate among five different ideal-types of institutional structures: the targeted (empirically exemplified by the Australian case), voluntary state subsidized, corporatist, basic security and encompassing model. In Table 1, these ideal-types and their most important features are delineated. Again, the Esping-Andersen model stands. However, a number of countries are no longer considered to belong to a subcategory of his three prototypes, but to a new prototype.

Gender, familialism and late female mobilization

By explicitly incorporating gender, several authors have tried to reconceptualize the dimensions of welfare state variation. Subjecting the mainstream welfare state typologies to an analysis of the differential places of men and women within welfare states would, according to them, produce valuable insights. This does not mean, however, that the characteristics used to construct the typologies are exhaustive (Sainsbury, 1996: 41). Gender analysis suggests that there are whole areas of social policy that Esping-Anderson simply misses. What seems to be particularly lacking is a systematic discussion of the family's place in the provision of welfare and care. Not only

the state and the market provide welfare, but also families. A further omission is that there is no serious treatment of the degree to which women are excluded from or included in the labour market.⁴ Instead of employing the all-or-nothing words 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' to gender differences, it seems sensible to stress the importance of partial citizenship (Bulmer and Rees, 1996: 275). Women obtained full civil and political rights a considerable time ago, but with regard to social rights, women are still discriminated against, sometimes formally, and nearly always informally because of different labour market positions, linked to different gender roles. According to many feminist authors, it is the sexual division of paid and unpaid work – especially care and domestic labour – that needs incorporating in the typology (Lewis, 1992; O'Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1996; O'Connor et al., 1999).

With respect to another issue, social care, Daly and Lewis (2000: 289) argue that different styles of social policy have incorporated the key element of social care differently. They identify certain tendencies concerning care in specific welfare states. For example, the Scandinavian countries form a distinct group in that they have strongly institutionalized care for both the elderly and children. In the Mediterranean welfare states, care tends to be privatized to the family whereas, in Germany, it is seen as most appropriately a function of voluntary service providers. In France, a strong distinction is made between care for children and for the elderly, with a strong collective sector in the former and little voluntary involvement. Another form is found in the Beveridge-oriented welfare states – Great Britain and Ireland – where a strong distinction is also made between caring for children and caring for (elderly) adults. In the former – as opposed to the latter – little collectivization has taken place. Although they do not really classify welfare states into actual clusters, Daly and Lewis make a strong case for using social care as a critical dimension for analysing variations.

As far as the gender gap in earnings is concerned, Gornick and Jacobs (1998) found that Esping-Andersen's regime-types do capture important distinctions among contemporary welfare states. Their results showed that the size of the public sector, the extent of the public-sector earnings premium and the impact of the public sector on gender differentials in wages all varied more across regimes than within them. In this way, they showed the fruitfulness of emphasizing the gender perspective in Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare states. Moreover, Trifiletti (1999) incorporated a gender perspective into Esping-Andersen's classification by showing that a systematic relationship exists between the level of decommodification and whether the state treats women as wives and mothers or as workers. The latter is also an important dimension identified by Lewis (1989).

Finally, Siaroff (1994) also argues that the existing literature does not pay enough attention to how gender inequality is embedded in social policy and welfare states. In order to arrive at a more gender-sensitive typology of welfare state regimes, he examines a variety of indicators of gender equality and inequality in work and welfare. He compares the work-welfare choice of men and women (i.e. whether to partake in the welfare state or to engage in paid labour) across countries. This allows him to distinguish among a Protestant social-democratic, a Protestant liberal, an Advanced Christian-democratic and a Late Female Mobilization welfare state regime. Although the labels suggest otherwise, this typology also shows a strong overlap with the Esping-Andersenian classification. Only the latter type – the Late Female Mobilization welfare state regime – is an addition, which resembles the previously distinguished Mediterranean type of welfare states.

Ideal and real-types

In Table 1, we ordered the types discussed above broadly in accordance with the worlds

of welfare capitalism as defined by Esping-Andersen. For example, Bonoli's Continental type is very much like Esping-Andersen's Conservative type; in both types contributions play a rather important role. Equally, Castles and Mitchell's Non-Right Hegemony type shows a large amount of congruence with Esping-Andersen's Social-democratic type, because of the high degree of universalism and equalization in social policy. We could go on, but we would like to raise another issue.

One may wonder whether, if the relationship among the different typologies is as strong as we assume, this close correspondence of types will also be apparent in the actual clustering of countries. Although not every classification developed by these authors covers the same nations, there is a rather large overlap which makes it possible to answer this question. For that purpose, Table 2 shows the extent to which the ideal-types – constructed by Esping-Andersen's critics – coincide with his own ideal-types. We then added the ideal-types, proposed by these critics, placing related ideal-types, when possible, under one heading. This results in five – instead of the original three – worlds of welfare capitalism and answers our original question. Next, in Table 2 we arranged the real-types according to the different ideal-types, thereby following the suggestions of the different authors.

It appears that, even when one uses different indicators to classify welfare states, some countries emerge as standard examples, approximating certain ideal-types. The United States is, according to everyone's classification, the prototype of a welfare state which can best be denoted as liberal (with or without the suffix: Protestant, Anglo-Saxon or basic security). Germany approaches the Bismarckian/Continental/conservative ideal-type and Sweden approximates the social-democratic ideal-type (Scandinavian/Nordic).

However, consensus seems to end here. For example, according to some, Italy can best be assigned to the second, corporatist/continental/conservative type, but belongs, according to others, along with Greece, Spain and

Table 2 Classification of countries according to seven typologies

	<i>Type</i>				
	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>V</i>
Esping-Andersen (Decommodification)	<i>Liberal</i> • Australia • Canada • <u>United States</u> • New Zealand • Ireland • United Kingdom	<i>Conservative</i> • Italy • Japan • France • <u>Germany</u> • Finland • Switzerland	<i>Social-democratic</i> • Austria • Belgium • Netherlands • Denmark • <u>Norway</u> • <u>Sweden</u>		
Leibfried	<i>Anglo-Saxon</i> • <u>United States</u> • Australia • New Zealand • United Kingdom	<i>Bismarck</i> • <u>Germany</u> • Austria	<i>Scandinavian</i> • <u>Sweden</u> • <u>Norway</u> • Finland • Denmark	<i>Latin Rim</i> • <u>Spain</u> • <u>Portugal</u> • <u>Greece</u> • <u>Italy</u> • France	
Castles & Mitchell	<i>Liberal</i> • Ireland • Japan • Switzerland • <u>United States</u>	<i>Conservative</i> • <u>West-Germany</u> • Italy • Netherlands	<i>Non-Right Hegemony</i> • Belgium • Denmark • <u>Norway</u> • <u>Sweden</u>		<i>Radical</i> • <u>Australia</u> • New Zealand • United Kingdom
Siaroff	<i>Protestant Liberal</i> • Australia • Canada • New Zealand • United Kingdom • <u>United States</u>	<i>Advanced Christian-democratic</i> • Austria • Belgium • France • <u>West-Germany</u> • Luxembourg • Netherlands	<i>Protestant Social-democratic</i> • Denmark • Finland • <u>Norway</u> • <u>Sweden</u>	<i>Late Female Mobilization</i> • <u>Greece</u> • Ireland • <u>Italy</u> • Japan • <u>Portugal</u> • <u>Spain</u> • Switzerland	
Ferrera (<i>Europe only</i>)	<i>Anglo-Saxon</i> • United Kingdom • Ireland	<i>Bismarckian</i> • <u>Germany</u> • France • Belgium • Netherlands • Luxembourg • Austria • Switzerland	<i>Scandinavian</i> • <u>Sweden</u> • Denmark • <u>Norway</u> • Finland	<i>Southern</i> • <u>Italy</u> • <u>Spain</u> • <u>Portugal</u> • <u>Greece</u>	

continued over

Table 2 continued

	<i>Type</i>				
	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>V</i>
Bonoli (<i>Europe only</i>)	<i>British</i> • United Kingdom • Ireland	<i>Continental</i> • Netherlands • France • Belgium • <u>Germany</u> • Luxembourg	<i>Nordic</i> • <u>Sweden</u> • Finland • <u>Norway</u> • Denmark	<i>Southern</i> • <u>Italy</u> • Switzerland • <u>Spain</u> • <u>Greece</u> • <u>Portugal</u>	
Korpi & Palme	<i>Basic Security</i> • Canada • Denmark • Netherlands • New Zealand • Switzerland • Ireland • United Kingdom • <u>United States</u>	<i>Corporatist</i> • Austria • Belgium • France • <u>Germany</u> • Italy • Japan	<i>Encompassing</i> • Finland • <u>Norway</u> • <u>Sweden</u>		<i>Targeted</i> • <u>Australia</u>

Note: Underlined countries indicate a prototype.

Portugal to a distinctive Mediterranean type. The same holds for Australia which may either be classified as liberal or is the prototype of a separate, radical welfare state. Nevertheless, as far as these countries and types are concerned, consensus is stronger than was initially assumed. One must, however, recognize that discussions are mainly concerned with whether certain types of welfare states are either separate categories or are subgroups of certain main types.

Hybrid cases are a bigger problem. The Netherlands and Switzerland are clear examples of this. If we take, for example, a closer look at the Dutch case, we see that Esping-Andersen (1990) originally assigned the Netherlands to the social-democratic type, whereas Korpi and Palme see it as liberally oriented; the basic security type. However, most authors place the Netherlands in the second category of corporatist/continental/conservative welfare states. This is also the choice of Visser and Hemerijck (1997), perhaps the foremost specialists on the Dutch welfare state. Curiously enough, this is done using Esping-Andersen's work as a constant, positive reference. If we have another look at Esping-Andersen's work, this is not as surprising as one would expect. It is true that the Netherlands is rated relatively high on social-democratic characteristics, but not exceptionally low on liberal and conservative characteristics. Recently, Esping-Andersen has called the Netherlands the 'Dutch enigma' because of its Janus-faced welfare regime (1999: 88). The Netherlands is indeed more a hybrid case than a prototype of a specific ideal-type. If one attaches more importance to certain attributes than to others – and adds other characteristics or substitutes previous ones – then it is easy to arrive at different classifications.

Empirical robustness of the three-way classification

Esping-Andersen claims that if we rate real

welfare states along the dimensions of degree of decommodification and the modes of stratification, three qualitatively different clusters will appear. Alongside the more fundamental criticism of his three-way classification – that Esping-Andersen employs faulty criteria to demarcate a regime – the empirical fit of his three-way classification has also been questioned. Several authors have tested the goodness-of-fit of the three-way regime typology. In the following, we discuss their findings, which are presented in Table 3.

In an effort to evaluate the possible extent to which quantitative techniques – OLS regression and cluster-analysis – suggest the same conclusions as alternative qualitative approaches – such as 'BOOLEAN' comparative analysis – Kangas (1994) found some support for the existence of Esping-Andersen's different welfare state regimes. Specifically, cluster-analyses of data on characteristics of health insurance schemes in OECD countries in 1950 and 1985 corroborated his conjectures. However, the results also showed the existence of two subgroups within the group of liberal welfare states, which largely accorded with the classification of Castles and Mitchell (1993).

Ragin (1994) also tested Esping-Andersen's claim of a three-world classification. By applying a combination of cluster-analysis and 'BOOLEAN' comparative analysis to characteristics of pension systems, he determined which, if any, of Esping-Andersen's three worlds of welfare capitalism each country fitted best. His cluster analysis suggested the existence of a social-democratic cluster, a corporatist cluster and, finally, a rather large 'spare' cluster, which accommodates cases that do not conform to Esping-Andersen's three worlds. On the basis of his findings, Ragin concludes that the three-worlds scheme does not capture existing diversity as adequately as one would wish.

Shalev (1996) applied factor analysis to 14 pension policy indicators collected by Esping-Andersen, to test for the presence of liberal, social-democratic and corporatist regime-

Table 3 Empirical robustness of the three-worlds typology

	<i>Number of clusters and cluster assignment</i>	<i>Method of analysis</i>
Kangas (1994)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: United States, Canada 2. <i>Conservative</i>: Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands 3. <i>Social-democratic</i>: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 4. <i>Radical</i>: Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom 	Cluster analysis
Ragin (1994)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, United States 2. <i>Corporatist</i>: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy 3. <i>Social-democratic</i>: Denmark, Norway, Sweden 4. <i>Undefined</i>: Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom 	BOOLEAN comparative analysis
Shalev (1996)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: United States, Canada, Switzerland, Japan 2. <i>Conservative</i>: Italy, France, Belgium, Austria, Ireland 3. <i>Social-democratic</i>: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland 4. <i>Undefined</i>: Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand 	Factor analysis
Obinger & Wagschal (1998)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: United States, Canada, Japan, Switzerland 2. <i>European</i>: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, United Kingdom, the Netherlands 3. <i>Conservative</i>: France, Italy, Austria 4. <i>Social-democratic</i>: Denmark, Norway, Sweden 5. <i>Radical</i>: Australia, New Zealand 	Cluster analysis
Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Liberal</i>: United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom 2. <i>Conservative</i>: France, Germany, Belgium 3. <i>Social-democratic</i>: Sweden, Denmark, Norway 4. <i>Undefined</i>: the Netherlands 	Principal component analysis

types. This factor analysis showed that the intercorrelations among these social policy indicators were dependent on two dimensions. The first factor measured the level of social-democratic features, whereas the second dimension measured corporatist features of welfare states. Based on the assignment of factor scores to individual nations, Shalev concluded that his findings were in close correspondence with Esping-Andersen's characterizations of the three welfare state regimes. He admitted, however, that some countries are difficult to classify.

Using cluster-analysis, Obinger and Wagschal (1998) tested Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare state regimes using the stratification-criterion. After a detailed re-analysis of Esping-Andersen's original data on stratification, they concluded that these data are best described by five regime-clusters. In addition to Esping-Andersen's conservative, liberal and social-democratic types, they distinguish a radical and a hybrid European cluster.

The most recent attempt to empirically corroborate Esping-Andersen's classification has been undertaken by Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001). This study examined the actual similarities and differences among the welfare state regimes of the countries originally included in Esping-Andersen's classification. For these countries, 58 characteristics of the labour market, tax regime and social protection system at the beginning of the 1990s were collected. These were submitted to a non-linear principal component-analysis. The results largely confirmed the three-regime typology of Esping-Andersen.

Summing up, Esping-Andersen's original three-worlds typology neither passes the empirical tests with flying colours, nor dismally fails them. The conclusion is, first, that his typology has at least some heuristic and descriptive value, but also that a case can be made for extending the number of welfare state regimes to four, or even five. Second, these analyses show that a significant number of welfare states must be considered hybrid cases: no particular case can ever perfectly

embody any particular ideal-type (Goodin et al., 1999: 56). Third, if one looks at other social programmes than the ones applied by Esping-Andersen, it becomes clear that they do not conform so easily – if at all – to his welfare regime patterns (Gough, 2000a: 4).

Conclusion and discussion

Before we reach our conclusions, let us examine how Esping-Andersen himself has reacted to the various attempts to amend his typology. The problem is that after considerable discussion it seems impossible for him to make up his mind once and for all. Initially, Esping-Andersen (1997) reacted, for example, positively to Castles and Mitchell's proposal to add a fourth type – a radical welfare state regime – to his typology. He recognized that the residual character and the matter of a means test are just one side of the coin of the Antipodean welfare states. However, he felt that a powerfully institutionalized collection of welfare guarantees, which operate through the market itself, could not be neglected. Later on, however, he argued that the passage of time is pushing Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand towards what appears to be prototypical liberalism (Esping-Andersen, 1999). At first he also partially supported the proposal to add a separate Mediterranean type to his typology (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 66; 1997: 171). He acknowledged the – sometimes generous – benefits which are guaranteed by certain arrangements, the near absence of social services and, especially, the Catholic imprint and high level of familism. From the feminist critics he learned not so much the overarching salience of gender as the analytical power that a re-examination of the family can yield. Recently he argued that the acid test of a distinct Mediterranean model depends on whether families are the relevant focus of social aid, and whether families will fail just as markets and states can fail (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 90).

All in all, Esping-Andersen is very reluctant

to add more regime-clusters to his original three. Against the benefits of greater refinement, more nuance and more precision, he weighs the argument of analytical parsimony, stressing that 'the peculiarities of these cases are variations within a distinct overall logic, not a wholly different logic *per se*' (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 90).

The answer to the question of whether Esping-Andersen's three-type or a derivative or alternative four, or five-type typology is preferable depends, however, not only on parsimony and verisimilitude. It also depends on whether these typologies lead to a theoretically more satisfying and empirically more fruitful comparative analysis of welfare state regimes. As far as theory construction is concerned, Baldwin (1996: 29) has argued that when asking about typologies, whether of welfare states or anything else, we must ask not just what but also why. Esping-Andersen's tentative answer to the question of why three different welfare state regime types emerged has been sketched earlier on in this paper. Different welfare regimes are shaped by different class coalitions within a context of inherited institutions. This answer is embedded in a power-resources mobilization paradigm. The tentative answer to the question of why regime shifts are scarce is that a national state cannot easily escape its historical inheritance. Institutional inertia is one factor why different welfare state regime types persist, and path dependency is another (Kohl, 2000: 125; Kuhnle and Alestalo, 2000: 9). Korpi and Palme – and some feminist authors – work in the same power-resources mobilization tradition as Esping-Andersen. It would be worthwhile to develop a theoretical reconstruction of the different contributions of this paradigm (for an initial impetus to such an endeavour, see Schmidt, 1998: 215–28). Only then could the explanatory value of the typology become apparent.

Whether there is, within the welfare modelling business, an alternative available to Esping-Andersen's power-resource mobilization cum institutional inertia/path dependency

theory is difficult to determine. The work of some of the other authors we discussed in this overview has a strong empiricist flavour. However, if we are searching for an underlying theoretical notion, it can be found in the rather general statement that similar causes have similar consequences. Considering the labels these authors have put to the prototypes they distinguish, which are predominantly geographical and ideological in nature, the most important causes are seen to be the pressure of functional exigencies and the diffusion of innovations (Goldthorpe, 2000: 54). The first factor could be translated into a 'challenge response' hypothesis. The challenges produced by the force of similar circumstances (characteristics of pre-industrial social structures, political institutions, degree of homogeneity of population, culture, problem perceptions and preferences) lead to comparable welfare state regimes (responses) (Kuhnle and Alestalo, 2000: 7). The second factor could be put in terms of learning effects in policy making. New ideas, new solutions are often a product of a diffusion process. They hit political systems and societies at different points in 'developmental time'. As far as this latter factor is concerned, Boje (1996: 15) argues that the fact that most welfare states are confronted with huge social problems has necessitated politicians finding alternative procedures, which may solve these problems more efficiently. Politicians have come to realize that much may be learned from other welfare states.

Castles (1993; 1998) too underscores the importance of both factors. He argues that it is likely that policy similarities and differences among welfare states can be attributed to both the force of circumstances and to diffusion. As far as the latter factor is concerned we can distinguish the institutional arrangements and culture of prototypical welfare states and their transmission and diffusion to other countries. Regarding the former factor, we can observe the immediate impact of economic, political and social variables identified in the contemporary public policy literature. Whether these

very general 'challenge response' and 'diffusion' hypotheses will be further developed remains to be seen. For the moment, we can conclude that, given the empiricist nature of the work of the authors who provided alternative typologies, there should be hardly any objection – for the time being – to the incorporation of their findings into a power-resources mobilization paradigm.

Finally, we arrive at the empirical fruitfulness of the typology. In his overview, Abrahamson (1999) concludes that as an organizing principle for comparative studies of welfare states the typologies have proven to be a very robust and convincing tool. Within the power-resources mobilization paradigm (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Esping-Andersen, 1990) it has been proposed that the nature of the welfare state regime would decisively influence support for certain forms of social policy. A type that is characterized by universalism would generate the strongest support, whereas arrangements which apply only to minorities would not succeed in winning the support of majorities. Tests of this hypothesis (Papadakis and Bean, 1993; Peillon, 1996; Gelissen, 2000; Gevers et al., 2000) have shown some empirical support, but the evidence is not really encouraging. More encouraging were the results of an effort (Gundelach, 1994) to explain cross-national differences in values with respect to welfare and care using the Esping-Andersenian welfare state regimes. Also, Svallfors's (1997) and Arts and Gelissen's (2001) tests of the hypothesis that different welfare state regimes matter for people's attitudes towards income-redistribution, were strongly endorsed. What especially matters to us here is that Svallfors distributive justice and solidarity had included not only Esping-Andersen's regime-types, but also other types and Arts and Gelissen.

It is more difficult to draw a conclusion concerning the influence that welfare state regimes have on social behaviour and their effects. Much of this research has a bearing on the distributive effects of welfare state regimes. Because they are often described in terms of

their intended social stratification, a tautological element easily sneaks into the explanations. Positive exceptions are Goodin et al. (1999) and Korpi and Palme (1998). Using panel-data, Goodin et al. (1999) show that welfare state regimes do not only have intended results, but also generate unintended consequences. As intended and expected, the social-democratic regime succeeds best in realizing its fundamental value: minimizing inequality. But this regime is also at least as good in promoting the goals to which other regimes ostensibly attach most importance. Specifically, the social-democratic regime also does very well in reducing poverty – a goal which is prioritized by the liberal welfare state regime – and in promoting stability and social integration, which is the home ground of the corporatist welfare state regime. Korpi and Palme (1998) find that institutional differences lead to a paradox of redistribution: the more benefits are targeted at the poor and the more the creation of equality through equal public transfers to all is a matter of priority, the less poverty and equality will be reduced. Thus, institutional arrangements characteristic of certain welfare state regimes not only have unintended consequences, but even perverse effects.

All in all, these conclusions provide sufficient impetus to continue the work concerning the resulting welfare state typology. A better formulation of the theory on which it is based deserves priority. Only then can predictions be logically – instead of impressionistically – deduced from theory. Only then is a strict test of the theory possible and only then will the heuristic and explanatory value of the typology become apparent.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Ian Gough and four anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.

Notes

- 1 This is an exaggeration. Schmidt (1998), Abrahamson (1999) and Arts and Gelissen

- (1999) have convincingly argued that the evidence is otherwise.
- 2 The importance of Catholicism is emphasized by van Kersbergen (1995) in his discussion including Christian-democratic nations such as Germany, Italy and the Netherlands in mainstream welfare state typologies.
 - 3 For reasons of conciseness we refrain from the debate regarding Esping-Andersen's classification of Japan as a liberal welfare state. For a reaction to this critique see Esping-Andersen (1997; 1999). Becker (1996) and Goodman and Peng (1996) are even of the opinion that Japan belongs to a sixth prototype of welfare state regimes, the so-called East-Asian welfare states. We acknowledge the importance of these arguments, but cannot engage with them here (Gough, 2000a; 2000b).
 - 4 Gornick and Jacobs (1998: 691) point out that Esping-Andersen himself argues that each regime-type is associated with women's employment levels. Specifically, he (Esping-Andersen, 1990) expects that women's employment rates will be highest in social-democratic countries, whereas in liberal welfare states, moderate levels of female employment will be found. The lowest levels of women's employment will be found in the conservative welfare states.
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